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Super-spreading occurs when a single patient infects a disproportionate number of contacts. The 2015
MERS-CoV, 2003 SARS-CoV, and to a lesser extent 2014–15 Ebola virus outbreaks were driven by super-
spreaders. We summarize documented super-spreading in these outbreaks, explore contributing factors,
and suggest studies to better understand super-spreading.Introduction
A number of recent virus outbreaks have
resulted in rapid virus spread, placing
demands on the affected health infra-
structures and sparking global concern.
In September 2012, Middle East Respira-
tory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
emerged as a novel virus that can result
in severe respiratory disease with renal
failure, with a case fatality rate of up to
38%. Primary infections typically occur
in countries located in the Middle East,
where dromedary camels have been iden-
tified as one of the species harboring the
virus. However, travel has contributed to
several cases in other countries. Notably,
between May and July 2015, an outbreak
of MERS-CoV centered in South Korea
killed 36 people out of 186 confirmed
cases (Promedmail.org, 2015), with thou-
sands quarantined as health authorities
attempted to control virus spread.
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
coronavirus (SARS-CoV), a close relative
of MERS-CoV, was the etiological agent
responsible for an outbreak centered
aroundGuangdong Province in the south-
east of China. The SARS-CoV outbreak
killed 774 and infected 8,096 people be-
tween November 2002 and July 2003,
for a case fatality rate of 9.6%, in which
the virus was first traced to palm civets,
and then bats. Over 80% of the total
cases and deaths were from mainland
China and Hong Kong.
More recently, a devastating Ebola
virus (EBOV) outbreak has swept through
Western Africa. EBOV is a filovirus that
causes severe hemorrhagic fever in hu-398 Cell Host & Microbe 18, October 14, 201mans with up to a 90% case fatality rate
if untreated. Outbreaks of EBOV are spo-
radic, unpredictable, and localized to
sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the 2014–15
outbreak, a total of 1,093 deaths out of
1,393 infections were documented dating
back to 1976, when EBOV first emerged.
The natural reservoir of EBOV is currently
unknown, but fruit bats are suspected to
be the animal species harboring the virus.
In addition to their significant impact,
these outbreaks were all perpetuated by
super-spreaders who disproportionately
infect a high number of contacts and likely
contribute to the speed and degree of the
outbreak. As discussed in detail below,
these outbreaks can be traced to one or
more individuals who largely contributed
to subsequent infections.
Super-Spreaders in the MERS-CoV
Outbreak in South Korea
The 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak in South
Korea began from an imported case, a
68-year-old male with a recent travel his-
tory to several Middle Eastern countries,
including Bahrain, the United Arab Emir-
ates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The latter
three countries also had reported human
cases of MERS-CoV during the same
period of time. After the patient started
exhibiting disease symptoms, he sought
medical assistance at several clinics
before being admitted to a hospital,
where he was confirmed to be infected
with MERS-CoV (WHO, 2015a). Twenty-
nine secondary infections have since
been directly traced to this index patient.
Additionally, two of these secondary5 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.cases were shown to be responsible for
106 subsequent infections, out of 166
known cases at the time (Cowling et al.,
2015). Transmission was mostly within
nosocomial settings, and fourth genera-
tion infections have been documented
for the first time since the virus was iden-
tified in 2012. Thus, the MERS-CoV
outbreak in South Korea was driven
primarily by three infected individuals,
and approximately 75% of cases can be
traced back to three super-spreaders
who have each infected a disproportion-
ately high number of contacts (Figure 1A).
This MERS-CoV outbreak is the second
largest on record and the largest outside
of the Middle East. The MERS-CoV
outbreak currently appears to be under
control, with no additional infections re-
ported in South Korea since July 4, 2015.
The SARS-CoV Outbreak
Retrospectively, several super-spreading
events were also documented during the
SARS-CoV outbreak in 2003. The index
patient of the Hong Kong epidemic was
treated at Prince of Wales Hospital and
was associated with at least 125 second-
ary cases (Riley et al., 2003). Subsequent
super-spreader events occurred at the
Hotel Metropole (13 cases) and the
Amoy Gardens housing complex (over
180 cases) in Hong Kong and aboard an
Air China flight traveling from Hong Kong
to Beijing (22 cases) (Braden et al.,
2013). Notably, cases from Hotel Metro-
pole were responsible for the spread
of SARS-CoV to Canada, Vietnam, and
Singapore through travel (Figure 1B),
Figure 1. Dynamics and the Role of Super-Spreaders in MERS-CoV
and SARS-CoV Transmission
(A and B) Simplified diagrams of super-spreading events driving the 2015
MERS-CoV (A) and 2003 SARS-CoV (B) outbreaks. Super-spreaders are
shown in red.
(C) The effect of super-spreaders during infection with a generic pathogen.
Most infected cases have limited transmission levels, but infection of super-
spreaders can rapidly increase the number of cases in the absence of early
intervention, resulting in a (prolonged) outbreak or epidemic.
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Canada resulted in 128
SARS-CoV cases at a Toronto
hospital (Braden et al., 2013).
Have Super-Spreaders
Played a Role in Other
Outbreaks?
To a lesser extent, similar
events were observed with
the 2014-15 EBOV outbreak,
centered in the Western
African countries of Guinea,
Sierra Leone, and Liberia.
Epidemiological work has
linked five infections with a
2-year-old toddler in the
remote village of Meliandou,
Guinea. One of the contacts,
a midwife, infected at least
three others, including a hos-
pital worker at Gue´cke´dou
hospital. This worker then
infected several family mem-
bers in the Gue´cke´dou
Farako district, as well as 15
others at Macenta hospital
(Baize et al., 2014). One of
the subsequent cases, a
doctor, was known to have in-
fected several others who
traveled to Kissidougou and
Nze´re´kore´, further propagat-
ing virus transmission (Baize
et al., 2014). The outbreak
eventually spilled over to
neighboring Liberia and Sierra
Leone. In Sierra Leone, the
funeral of a traditional healer
that died from EBOV was
shown to have directly in-
fected 13 others (Gire et al.,
2014) and was eventually
linked to more than 300 cases
(WHO, 2015b). The EBOV
outbreak has killed 11,284
people, with 27,741 infectedas of July 19 2015, en route to becoming
the largest filovirus outbreak ever docu-
mented. In addition to EBOV, super-
spreading has also been documented in
outbreakswith other pathogens, including
measles (Paunio et al., 1998) and Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis (Kline et al., 1995).
Why Is the Super-Spreader
Phenomenon Important?
The initial stages of the outbreaks
mentioned above involved at least oneCell Host & Microbesuper-spreading event. The ability of the
pathogen to infect subsequent super-
spreaders who may export the disease
through travel is likely the difference
between an infection cluster and an
outbreak or epidemic (Figure 1C). Differ-
ences in the initial response to MERS-
CoV is why South Korea reported clusters
of infections before bringing the virus un-
der control and why China, Thailand, and
thePhilippines havenot reportedanyaddi-
tional cases despite imported MERS-CoV18, October 14infections. It was why SARS-
CoV was so devastating in
mainland China and Hong
Kong from 2002 to 2003. It
was also why the 2014–15
EBOV outbreak spiraled out
of control in Western Africa,
with hundreds of new cases
reported weekly, before a co-
ordinated international effort
(including contact tracing,
isolation, diagnosis, and treat-
ment of infected patients, as
well as community education)
brought the number down
to a more manageable 20–
30 weekly infections, with
most of the cases diagnosed
in Guinea and Sierra Leone.
Early discovery, diagnosis,
intervention, and quarantine
of confirmed cases is crucial
for preventing further disease
transmission in humans, espe-
cially via super-spreaders. As
evidenced by the decreased
numbers of new cases in the
MERS-CoV and EBOV out-
breaks, current responses are
effective, provided that the
measures are implemented
properly and followed strictly.
Vigilance and patience will be
necessary until the ongoing
MERS-CoV and EBOV out-
breaks are officially at an end.
Approaches or
Guidelines that Can
Proactively Identify
Super-Spreaders
Currently, super-spreaders
are only retrospectively cate-
gorized after epidemiological
tracing. Given their high pro-
pensity to spread infection,
super-spreaders should beable to shed higher levels of pathogen
and/or for a longer period of time after
infection. This would increase the pro-
bability that the pathogen contacts and
subsequently infects a naive host.
To address whether there are factors
or parameters that promote or indicate
enhanced virus shedding in a laboratory
setting, an animal species that closely re-
capitulates symptoms of the human dis-
ease is required, such that any findings
can be translated to humans. Animals, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 399
Table 1. Factors that May Influence Infectious Diseases Transmission
Factors that
Influence
Transmission Examples from MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV, and EBOV
Virus and Host Virus mutation: the virus may acquire mutations to replicate more efficiently and become highly pathogenic, which may
result in higher levels of virus shedding for a longer period of time.
Duration of contact with an infectious host and route of infection: in a guinea pig model of EBOV infection, animals that
were infected mucosally were more infectious than those that were infected systemically. Additionally, prolonged contact
with a contagious animal resulted in a higher rate of virus transmission.
Genetic susceptibility: EBOV is known to be more pathogenic in cynomolgus macaques compared to other nonhuman
primate species, such as rhesus macaques. Different nonhuman primate species also demonstrate variable susceptibility
to SARS-CoV infection. Hosts that are more susceptible to disease may exhibit higher levels of virus shedding.
Underlying medical conditions: certain conditions may decrease immunity and increase susceptibility to pathogens,
leading to enhanced virus shedding. Many fatal MERS-CoV patients in the recent outbreak in South Korea had other
pre-existing medical conditions, including pneumonia and kidney disease.
Environment Air re-circulation in enclosed spaces: this would increase chances of pathogen encounter, especially those that are
airborne. During the SARS-CoV outbreak, this was shown to be a factor behind super-spreading events at the
Hotel Metropole, Amoy Gardens housing complex, and a flight between China and Canada. It is likely a contributing
factor to the MERS-CoV outbreak since super-spreading events occurred at a hospital or medical clinic.
Population density: increased numbers of people equally increases the chances to infect a naive host through
inadvertent direct or indirect contact.
Behavior Traditional customs and beliefs conducive to infectious disease spread: the culture of ‘‘doctor shopping,’’ in which
patients seek medical attention from multiple doctors at different clinics/hospitals allowed MERS-CoV to spread rapidly
in South Korea. Unsafe burials and traditional funerals, which involve touching and washing infectious bodies, played a role
in EBOV spread in Western Africa.
Travel and trade: the global nature of today’s world allows infectious diseases to easily bypass geographical barriers.
For instance, MERS-CoV originated from the Middle East, but imported cases were reported in North America, Europe,
and Asia. SARS-CoV originated in Asia, and imported cases were reported in North America, Europe, and other parts of
Asia. EBOV originated from Africa, and imported cases were reported in North America and Europe.
Knowledge and adherence to public health advice: during the MERS-CoV outbreak, a case was imported to China
because a South Korean patient did not follow the recommendations of health authorities and traveled despite being
a symptomatic, high-risk contact. However, China handled the imported case properly, and the imported Korean patient
did not become a super-spreader. During the EBOV outbreak, some patients were able to escape quarantine,
thereby increasing the likelihood of infecting others.
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different virus strains/variants at varying
doses via different challenge routes, in
which virus shedding from the oral, nasal,
and rectal cavities should be correlated
withdifferentparameters, includingviremia
or virus titers in the organs. However, these
studies are currently challenging for SARS-
CoVas there is currently not anappropriate
animalmodel that replicates theseveredis-
ease seen in humans; infected nonhuman
primates exhibit variable, but at most mild
tomoderate, respiratorydisease (McAuliffe
et al., 2004) (Lawler et al., 2006). Nonethe-
less, these types of studies are feasible
for MERS-CoV. A model of this infection
was developed in the common marmoset
that results in severe respiratory disease
and partial lethality, in which live virus can
be detected in nasal and throat swabs of
infected animals (Falzarano et al., 2014).
Thus, the studies proposed above can
be investigated with MERS-CoV in this
animal model.400 Cell Host & Microbe 18, October 14, 201For EBOV, the cynomolgus and rhesus
macaque animal models are well charac-
terized and have been used over the past
20+ years. EBOV shedding is known to
occur from the oral, nasal, and/or rectal
cavities of nonhuman primates during
the advanced stages of disease, but fac-
tors that influence virus shedding from
these animals have not yet been investi-
gated. Interestingly, using a guinea pig
model, it was shown that animals infected
intranasally (i.n.) with guinea pig-adapted
EBOV were more contagious to naive
contact animals than those that were
infected intraperitoneally (i.p.) with the
same dose (Wong et al., 2015). I.n. in-
fected animals shed virus from their nasal
cavity earlier than their i.p. counterparts,
and i.p. challenged animals died earlier
(and thus were removed from contact
with naive animals) compared to i.n. inoc-
ulated guinea pigs. It was therefore
concluded that the route of infection in
addition to the duration of contact time5 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.with an infectious host may be factors
that influence the efficiency of virus trans-
mission. It will take time to elucidate all
possible host and viral factors that
contribute to virus shedding, which re-
mains an understudied topic to date.
Therefore, it is not currently possible to
predict with any level of confidence or sta-
tistical significance whether a person will
become a super-spreader of a certain dis-
ease. Large-scale genome-wide associa-
tion studies (GWAS) of super-spreaders
might provide some clues about the ge-
netic backgrounds of super-spreaders,
but the feasibility and robustness of these
analyses will depend on the number of
super-spreaders in a given outbreak.
Additional Approaches to
Study Risk Factors behind
Super-Spreading
The large amount of patient data and
samples available from the recent
MERS-CoV and EBOV outbreaks provide
Cell Host & Microbe
Forumpossible opportunities to investigate fac-
tors that may correlate with an increased
risk for becoming a super-spreader.
Using the MERS-CoV outbreak as an
example, detailed records were kept for
the majority of patients who were
confirmed to be infected with MERS-
CoV. Since the identities of the three
super-spreaders are known as Patients
#1, #14, and #16, studies can be per-
formed to investigate whether these three
patients have common traits (i.e., age,
gender, pre-existing medical conditions
or underlying co-morbidities, levels of
virus shedding, etc.). Any common
characteristics can then be compared
with non-super-spreader patients to pro-
vide insight into possible risk factors
behind enhanced spreading of infectious
diseases.
Another approach would be to isolate
MERS-CoV from the three known super-
spreaders, perform sequence analysis of
the viral genomes, and determine whether
there are any shared mutations between
these isolates. Any mutations that are
identified and are absent from the viral
genomes of other patients could be
indicators of enhanced virus shedding,
allowing for super-spreading to occur.
Concluding Remarks
A complex combination of factors likely
plays a role in the number of subsequent
infections initiating from a single super-
spreader. In addition to host and virus
factors, other important factors impacting
the spread of infectious diseases are
the environment and behavior of indi-
viduals. Environmental factors include
the close proximity of other susceptible
hosts and the airflow dynamics within
an enclosed area. A high population den-
sity represents a greater number of sus-
ceptible hosts for direct/indirect contact
with an infected person, whereas air re-
circulation would especially facilitate the
transmission of airborne viruses, such as
MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV. Hospitals,
enclosed housing complexes, and mass
transportation, such as airplanes, are
documented sites of super-spreaderevents, especially during the MERS-CoV
and SARS-CoV outbreaks (Table 1).
Individual behaviors may also enhance
disease spread. These include ‘‘doctor
shopping’’—going to multiple hospitals
to treat the same ailments or traveling to
other countries after the appearance of
disease symptoms, which was observed
with the MERS-CoV outbreak (Su et al.,
2015). Traditional customs, such as
unsafe funerals/burials in Africa, which
involve direct contact with infectious
bodily fluids of patients that passed
away from EBOV disease, is another
major reason why the outbreak persisted
in Guinea and Sierra Leone (Table 1).
A thorough study of host, virus, and
environmental dynamics will be important
to delineate the relative contribution
of each factor to the phenomenon
of super-spreading. Findings from these
studies, combined with changes in
behavior conducive to the spread of dis-
ease, will be important for the effective
management of and preparation for future
outbreaks.
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